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Introduction 
 
Over recent years the concepts and language of health and security have become increasingly 
intertwined as a result of changes within both the health and the security policy communities. The 
public health community has become increasingly sensitive to the links between health and global 
political, social and economic structures and processes. This has included a clearer recognition of the 
threats posed by disease in a globalized world, not least through the rapid international spread of 
pathogens. In response to these concerns the public health community has increasingly sought to 
strategically utilise security language in an attempt to secure greater political attention (and 
resources) for tackling global health issues. For their part, foreign and security policy communities, 
particularly in the West, have vastly expanded their remits and range of interests in the post-Cold 
War era. Health has come onto their agendas, with significant implications for how ‘security’ is 
understood and practised (Elbe, 2010; Elbe in this issue). These two very different policy 
communities have become to some extent united behind the ‘Health Security’ banner, but many 
have worried that the shared language masks deep divisions in aims, methods and values. In 
particular some have pointed to a danger that public health will become subjugated to powerful 
security interests, with potentially negative consequences for the health of individuals and 
communities. Yet there is another divide which is becoming increasingly evident in debates around 
health security -  a divide between the Global North and the Global South. 
 
This article seeks to interrogate the concept of ‘health security’, and in particular the ‘Global Health 
Security’ variant which has become a major feature of the policy discourse in recent years. The 
discussion centres around two questions which have become extremely well-established within 
security studies: “Whose security?” and “Security from what?” the article is motivated by what 
appear to be the early signs of discontent from some developing states over the concept of Global 
Health Security and its political implications. The developing world is being asked to bear many of 
the costs of ensuring Global Health Security, but suspicions are evident in some quarters that these 
measures may in fact be primarily about the protection of the West. Commentators such as William 
Aldis (2008) have correctly argued that the concept of Global Health Security has been widely used 
but rarely adequately defined. There is, therefore, a clear need for greater scrutiny of the concept, 
but also of its political implications.  
 
The article begins by examining the concept of health security and arguing that there is in fact a 
good deal more consensus on its core features than we are often led to believe. It is argued that the 
state is generally viewed as the referent object (although alternative conceptualisations drawing on 
human security approaches are in evidence in some places) and that there is also a high level of 
commonality in the dominant policy discourse over what the major threats to health security are. 
This, it is argued, centres around a relatively small number of health issues: rapidly spreading 
infectious diseases; HIV and AIDS; and biological weapons/bioterrorism. This limited range of widely-
recognized ‘health security threats’, the paper argues, tells us a good deal about the political 
agendas which underpin the concept. These are a particular set of health risks which are primarily 
seen as major threats by Western developed nations. Views from the Global South about the most 
pressing threats to health within their nations are often strikingly different. Indeed, many of the 
diseases which have been widely framed and officially accepted in the West as major health security 
risks are endemic in parts of the Global South. This is the first step in the argument that the 
discourse of health security has tended to be a relatively narrow one, focussing in practice (although 
this is rarely made explicit) on the protection of the West from threats emanating from the 
developing world. The nature of existing global health governance responses, which tend to be 
overwhelmingly characterised by a focus on containment rather than prevention (Aldis, 2008; 
Labonté and Gagnon, 2010, p.5), heightens unease about ‘whose security’ really counts. 
 
The second part of the article builds upon this discussion of the politicized nature of health security 
and examines the currently popular concept of ‘Global Health Security’.. Through an examination of 
some of the most high-profile uses of the Global Health Security concept I argue that the focus tends 
to be overwhelmingly (albeit implicitly) on securing states against the ingress of disease (and in 
particular rapidly spreading infectious diseases which worry the West). Global Health Security, 
therefore, seems to have much more in common with traditional ideas of  national and international 
security (which Sara E. Davies (2010) has referred to as the “statist perspective” in global health) 
than concepts such as human security (or Davies’ “globalist perspective”) which might allow for the 
inclusion ofa broader range of threats to human wellbeing. 
 
In the concluding section I argue that much of the controversy around Global Health Security is the 
result of a feeling in some quarters that this discourse relates primarily to a Western conception of 
risk, and that the result has been the prioritization of measures designed to contain disease within 
the developing world rather than measures designed to address the root causes of disease. 
Importantly the argument is not that addressing the deficiencies in the Global Health Security regime 
is unimportant, nor that such activities should not be carried out. Clearly protecting populations 
from disease is a good in itself, and populations in the West have as much right as those elsewhere 
to benefit from such protection. Furthermore, Global Health Security measures might, as some 
claim, have ’trickle-down’ benefits for developing countries in the long run. Nevertheless, there is 
the need for a far more explicit recognition of the primary beneficiaries from the system, and of who 
is bearing the costs. Only in the light of such a recognition can meaningful debates be carried out 
over the appropriate prioritization of such activities in relation to other global health challenges.  
 
 
Health Security: Essentially contested or essentials agreed?  
 
In People, States and Fear Barry Buzan (1991, p.7) famously described security as an ‘essentially 
contested’ concept, one of a number of such concepts which generate ‘unsolvable debates about 
their meaning and application.’ Although this idea has been widely repeated, others took Buzan to 
task for his claim, arguing that security does not fulfil some of the criteria of true ‘essentially 
contestedness’ (Baldwin 1997, pp.10-12); that the debates which are taking place around security 
are in fact a relatively new phenomenon (McSweeney, 1999); and that in any case there is 
widespread agreement over the core elements of security (Booth, 2007, pp.99-100). Yet, 
notwithstanding this debate over whether the concept of security must necessarily always be 
contested, most would at least agree that security has been the subject of a wide variety of 
definitions, several proposals for redefinition (Tickner, 1995), and numerous attempts at either 
broadening its scope or defending its boundaries (Walt, 1991). 
 
Given that, it should not be a surprise to find that the comparatively young concept of ‘health 
security’ is still some way away from a universally-agreed definition. It is certainly the case that the 
health security tag is being used in a variety of ways. It is often used alone, but equally often in 
conjunction with a variety of modifiers - ‘national health security’ (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, 2009); ‘international health security’ (Chiu et al, 2009); ‘global health security’ 
(WHO, 2001) – or in conjunction with concepts such as that of ‘human security’. Writing in Health 
Policy & Planning in 2008, William Aldis argued that the huge range of different definitions of ‘health 
security’ currently in circulation have created ‘confusion and mistrust.’ He outlined the recent 
debates which have erupted over whose interests are being served in health security and the 
growing concerns of some developing nations that the costs and benefits of ‘Global Health Security’ 
are not being equitably distributed. In response to these concerns Aldis (2008, p.370) argued that 
stakeholders need to find a definitional consensus. He concluded his article by stating that 
 
Ambiguity and confusion surrounds the concept of ‘health security’. This has caused damage 
to international relationships, and is likely to lead to more problems in the future. The global 
public health community must work toward a common understanding of the concept, 
starting with the acceptance that there is a problem. (Aldis, 2008, p.374) 
 
Aldis is right that the tendency for health to be linked with security in the policy discourse is causing 
tensions and, as is discussed below, debate has recently been crystallizing around the relatively new 
(predominantly post-2000) concept of ‘Global Health Security’. However, here I suggest that 
uncertainty about the meaning of health security is not really the root of the problem. Indeed, 
despite some dissenting voices, there is in fact a broad consensus over the core features of health 
security, namely the types of health issue which constitute a threat; the types of response which are 
necessary; and the referent object. The debate, I would argue, cannot be solved by definitional 
agreement but only by grappling with  the political implications of this dominant conceptualisation. 
 
 
Security from what? 
 Whilst, as Aldis, says there is no formally (let alone universally) accepted definition of health 
security, an analysis of the academic literature on the subject - the overwhelming majority of which 
is written in the West and focuses either upon Western policy communities or the major multilateral 
institutions – gives an extremely interesting insight into the types of health issues which are 
commonly being seen as threats to health security. The characteristic claims associated with health 
security in the literature can be boiled down to three common arguments (see Feldbaum and Lee, 
2004, pp.22-4):1 
 
i) That the fast-moving nature of infectious disease in a globalized world poses a 
threat to individuals, populations, or states. 
 
ii) That pathogens may be weaponized, either by terrorists or through state-sponsored 
biological weapons programmes, and used against military forces and/or civilian 
populations. 
 
iii) That a severe burden of disease (HIV/AIDS is by far the most commonly cited) can 
have social, political, economic and military impacts which threaten the stability of 
states and regions.2 
 
In general, then, it seems fairly clear what types of health issue the literature sees as threats to 
health security: the threat emanates either from the spread of infectious diseases, whether naturally 
occurring, deliberate or accidental; or from the effect of major health crises on traditional problems 
of state stability and security.  
 
This same list of health security threats also dominates the mainstream policy discourse. Some 
examples of these (the IHR-linked global health security discourse which has been in evidence at the 
WHO and the Global Health Security Initiative) are examined in greater detail below. There are, 
however, many other examples from both national and international policy contexts. The UN 
Security Council’s Resolution 1308, which addressed the security dimensions of HIV/AIDS, has been 
widely noted. Rapidly-spreading infectious disease threats – especially pandemic influenza – have 
assumed a prominent position in many domestic security policy statements. The landmark US 
National Intelligence Estimate on the Global Infectious Disease Threat and its Implications for the 
United States was a classic example (National Intelligence Council. 2000). The US’ subsequent 
National Health Security Strategy (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2009) and the 
UK’s new National Security Strategy (HM Government, 2010, p,27) are others.  
                                                          
1
 There is also the reverse hypothesis, which I pass over here: that insecurity and conflict lead to ill health both 
directly (e.g. that conflict causes death and injury and is a vector for the spread of disease) and indirectly (e.g. 
that conflict has a deleterious effect on health systems). 
2
 Less commonly, but nevertheless importantly, a fourth is now being added by some scholars (e.g. Enemark, 
2007; Enemark & Ramshaw, 2009): iv) That the risks associated with laboratory research (for example on 
pathogens or some types of nanotechnology) are a potential source of security threat. 
 Interestingly, Aldis (2008, p.372) comes to a very different conclusion about the level of agreement 
over the ‘security from what?’ question. He notes that 
 
A search of the term [health security] using an internet search engine confirms an alarming 
lack of agreement on the meaning and scope of the concept. Of the first 100 citations found 
on the search, 44 referred only to bio-terrorism or trans-border spread of disease, 36 
referred to effects of rising health care costs and health insurance in developed countries, 2 
referred only to HIV/AIDS, 10 referred to unrelated matters (e.g. electronic home protection 
systems), and only 7 referred to health security in the sense intended by UNDP [i.e. as part 
of ‘human security’]. 
 
Yet these results have the potential to be somewhat misleading. For one, we can easily discount the 
10 “unrelated matters” as a product of search engine technology: putting almost any two words 
together in a search will produce some ‘outlier’ results which do not relate to the subject of the 
search. Similarly we should discount the 36 that relate to developed country health care costs: these 
results are the product of a separate (largely domestic US) political debate which has, admittedly, 
also employed the term ‘health security’. But that debate is distinct from the one being addressed in 
this paper (and in Aldis’). It is hard to believe that the arguments of Oregonians for Health Security 
or the provisions of the Wisconsin Health Security Act 2007 are what is causing tensions between 
developed and developing countries. That leaves 46 which fit within the categories outlined above 
(bioterror, trans-border disease and AIDS), 7 which relate to human security (discussed below) and 
46 which are irrelevant for our purposes.3 Thus, Aldis’ search engine results actually confirm the 
relatively cohesive set of health security concerns argued for here, with biological weapons, AIDS 
and infectious disease being overwhelmingly dominant and human security-based approaches 
playing a smaller but not insignificant part. Tobacco-related diseases, although they threaten health 
on a massive scale, are seldom if ever discussed in ‘health security’ terms. Neither are road deaths. 
Nor diarrhoeal diseases. As Aldis’ findings confirm, it is almost exclusively infectious diseases which 
have, to date, gained the necessary degree of immediacy and novelty to become widely understood 
as security risks (McInnes, 2005, pp.15-17).  
 
Importantly for the argument here, the range of recognised health security threats is actually even 
more limited than this suggests since not all infectious diseases have come to be widely seen as 
threats to health security. Feldbaum and Lee (2004, p.24-5) make a persuasive case that those 
diseases which are most likely to be treated in such terms are those which impact on population 
rather than individual health; have high levels of morbidity/mortality; are acute rather than long-
term in their impacts; and readily cross borders. This seems to be borne out in practice where the 
focus of attention in terms of naturally-occurring threats has overwhelmingly been on pandemic 
influenza, emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases (SARS is an oft-cited example) and 
                                                          
3
 Aldis’ figures only total 99. 
HIV/AIDS. I am certainly not the first to note that this is not reflective of the overall global burden of 
disease (e.g. McInnes & Lee, 2006). Only one of the top ten causes of death worldwide (WHO, 
2010a) – HIV/AIDS – is widely treated as a health security issue. Those diseases which are linked with 
security are those which have been constructed in major Western developed nations (most clearly in 
the US, but also in Canada, Europe and elsewhere) as security threats and have led to ‘epidemic-
induced fear’ amongst governments and citizens (Labonte and Gagnon, 2010, p.4). Thus the 
dominant health security discourse captures only a very small proportion of the issues which 
threaten individual and population health worldwide – those which are of concern to the West 
(Labonte and Gagnon, 2010, p.5) - and at the same time threatens to obscure those causes of 
morbidity and mortality which have not been securitized. As Sarah Dry (2008, p.5) has noted, the 
health security discourse  “privileges acute outbreak events that occur on a daily or weekly basis as 
opposed to chronic factors, such as changes in land use and host and vector population, which occur 
over years or decades, and which account for broader trends.” The health security agenda is a 
significantly skewed one, reflecting the concerns of the most powerful actors in the international 
system (see Abraham in this issue).  
 
 
Defending against Health Security threats: the need for a global response 
 
The result of the dominance of this relatively limited view of ‘health security’ is that there follows a 
considerable commonality over the appropriate types of response. That doesn’t mean that these 
things are necessarily being done, but there is general agreement over what needs to be done. The 
types of response which are typically put forward as a means of defending against both trans-border 
infectious disease and biological weapon threats can be divided into two categories: surveillance and 
emergency response.4 
 
Surveillance activities have traditionally rested primarily either on domestic national health 
infrastructure (i.e. local diagnosis; laboratory confirmation; notification to regional/national public 
health authorities; regional/national data gathering and analysis to detect unusual clusters etc) or on 
border controls (health declarations, temperature scanners, quarantine arrangements etc). But 
whilst the efficacy of surveillance activities rests largely upon the domestic health infrastructure of 
states there is a universal recognition that international cooperation on disease surveillance is 
required. The International Health Regulations (IHR, discussed below, and in more detail by Youde in 
this issue) set the overall framework for international infectious disease surveillance and reporting, 
                                                          
4
 HIV/AIDS (which, although related, is in some ways also a slightly separate debate to that which has 
surrounded infectious disease and biological weapons) is a slightly different case. In that case both surveillance 
and response remain important but the long-wave nature of the threat calls for a longer-term and broader 
engagement with those states that are at risk from instability. Andrew Price-Smith (2002, p.15) makes a nice 
distinction between ‘outbreak events’ and ‘attrition processes’. HIV/AIDS is clearly one of the latter and as a 
result has attracted a somewhat broader range of responses, including an increasing emphasis on Health 
System Strengthening as a prerequisite for tackling HIV/AIDS.  
requiring states to report to the WHO outbreaks which are of potential international significance. In 
order to make this achievable the IHR include details of the capacities and procedures which states 
are required to put in place in their national health systems and at ports and airports (WHO, 2005). 
Whether the disease threat is naturally occurring or man-made, early warning is the key. Although in 
the modern world outbreaks can rarely be contained completely, early identification and the putting 
in place of the appropriate public health measures can radically reduce the scale and scope of the 
risk.  
 
Emergency response measures are similarly dependent on health system capabilities. Such systems 
(in the developed world at least) are typically designed with the aim of providing the capacity to 
respond to any health emergency (whether natural or deliberate), and are frequently part of 
broader disaster preparedness plans. Key techniques include training of emergency services/health 
professionals; public communication strategies; decontamination facilities; vaccine/antiviral 
stockpiles etc. But here too there is an international dimension, with the WHO having the authority 
to undertake a range of actions including providing assistance to a state during an outbreak, issuing 
travel advisories, or making other recommendations on appropriate measures and responses. 
Although it has been criticized in some quarters, the level of media attention devoted to WHO press 
conferences during the recent ‘Swine flu’ outbreak was a powerful demonstration of the global 
reach of its proclamations. 
 
Notably, both of these types of activities are containment-focussed, and indeed with the 2005 
revision of the IHR this became even more the case as the emphasis shifted away from border 
controls towards containment of outbreaks at source. The aim of these measures is to identify and 
then respond to outbreaks of disease with the aim of limiting their spread, either domestically or 
across borders. Whilst they rely for their effectiveness on a functioning public health infrastructure, 
they are generally treated separately to the type of public health provision (which includes 
everything from the provision of potable water to public health education) which play a vital role in 
the prevention of outbreaks. Thuscontainment and prevention have to a great extent become 
decoupled. The measures which are generally presented as being in pursuit of health security are far 
more commonly geared towards outbreak containment rather than disease prevention. 
 
The global dimensions of health security have become increasingly prominent over time. There 
certainly seems to be a universal belief that a global-level response is required. With good reason, 
infectious disease has become inextricably linked with globalization in both the policy and academic 
discourses. Nobody seriously argues that states can unilaterally defend their borders against the 
ingress of disease. All agree that protecting health security requires international cooperation within 
a robust global regime. Major health-related security policy statements have commonly recognized 
this need, the US’s National Health Security Strategy, for example noting that:  
 
Given that many of the threats faced by the Nation do not recognize geographic boundaries, 
the interdependence of national public health communities around the world and the 
international organizations that support them must be acknowledged. Existing health 
security partnerships allow the Nation to access information about threats outside our 
borders, from the health, diplomatic, defense, intelligence, and law enforcement 
communities as well as from human and animal disease surveillance networks. These 
partnerships strengthen the Nation’s health security by allowing for sharing and comparing 
of experiences and strategies for prevention, response, and recovery and for joint 
emergency response exercises. (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2009) 
 
The logic underlying this belief is clear. As international travel and trade have increased it has 
become abundantly evident that states cannot unilaterally defend their borders against disease, at 
least not without totally isolating themselves from the global economy. As the 2007 World Health 
Report noted (WHO, 2007, p.2), “an outbreak or epidemic in one part of the world is only a few 
hours way from becoming an imminent threat elsewhere.” A ‘Maginot Line’ approach is destined to 
fail, at least in the case of naturally-occurring disease outbreaks. Thus states have generally come to 
see international cooperation on disease control as being within their interests. The failure of global 
efforts to identify and contain infectious disease outbreaks represents a very real threat to their 
national security.  
 
 
Human security and health security 
 
Yet such an infectious-disease focussed and state-centric version of health security is only one 
potential conceptualization. Sara E. Davies (2010) has drawn a distinction between a ‘statist’ 
perspective (which presents health issues “as being equivalent to national security threats”) and a 
‘globalist’ one (which focuses on health at the individual level, and on the extent to which the state 
is meeting health needs). This ‘globalist’ perspective is exemplified by the concept of human 
security. And, as Aldis found, the health security terminology has also been used to refer to one of 
the fundamental elements of  human security. Human security originally rose to prominence 
through the UNDP's 1994 Human Development Report which claimed (p.22) that “[t]he idea of 
human security, though simple, is likely to revolutionize society in the 21st century.”  The report 
went on to say (p.23) that 
 
Human security can be said to have two main aspects, It means, first, safety from such 
chronic disease threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection 
from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs 
or in communities. 
 Health security was explicitly identified as one of the components of human security from the outset 
(along with economic, food, environment, personal, community and political). And, in marked 
contrast with the narrow focus on infectious disease threats outlined above, health security was 
deliberately viewed in the widest sense, incorporating the full range of communicable and non-
communicable diseases and explicitly linking health with poverty and inequality (UNDP, 1994, pp.27-
8). The subsequent report of the Commission on Human Security (2003, p.96) echoed this broader 
notion of health security, noting that 
 
Health security is at the vital core of human security – and illness, disability and avoidable 
death are “critically pervasive threats” to human security. 
 
Undoubtedly this is a far broader understanding of security threats (and therefore a different answer 
to the ‘security from what?’ question), but it also provides a very different referent object. As the 
name suggests, human security attempts to make individuals rather than states the referent object 
of security (it is frequently described as a “people-centred approach” (e.g. Chen & Narasimhan, 
2003, p.3)). The distinctive core of human security is thus encapsulated in two shifts: i) the 
recognition of a broader range of threats and ii) the re-specification of the primary referent object 
from the state to the individual/community. In principle, then, it seems to be a good candidate for a 
version of health security which is “better equipped to capture the importance of addressing illness 
for the lives of ordinary individuals” (Elbe, 2005, pp.415-6).  
 
 
Interrogating ‘Global Health Security’ 
 
Here, then we have two radically different formulations of health security: a statist/national security 
one, which takes the state as its referent object and is focussed primarily on stopping diseases 
entering or otherwise destabilizing states and societies, and a globalist/human security one, which 
takes the individual as the referent object and is open to the consideration of a much broader range 
of issues which threaten individual health and wellbeing. Which is reflected in the contemporary 
Global Health Security discourse? Given the extent to which Global Health Security has defined the 
current global health policy zeitgeist, and given the lack of precision with which the term is used, this 
is an important issue and offers a window onto some of the controversies surrounding the concept. 
Here I examine some of the most prominent formulations of the Global Health Security concept in 
the policy world with the aim of uncovering both the types of security threats to which they identify, 
and their approach to the referent object question: are these human-centred or state-centric 
approaches to security? 
 
 Global Health Security and the International Health Regulations 
 
For much of the last decade the WHO has been enthusiastically pushing the idea of Global (Public) 
Health Security. The concept has appeared in World Health Assembly Resolutions (WHA, 2001), in 
reports by the Secretariat (WHO, 2001), and in articles written by key WHO officials (Hardiman, 
2003). Its most high-profile airing to date was the 2007 World Health Report which focussed on 
Global Public Health Security – and indeed did include some issues above and beyond the common 
menu of health security threats, including within the definition 
 
acute public health events that endanger the collective health of populations living across 
geographical regions and international boundaries. As illustrated in this report, global health 
security, or lack of it, may also have an impact on economic or political stability, trade, 
tourism, access to goods and services and, if they occur repeatedly, on demographic 
stability. Global public health security embraces a wide range of complex and daunting 
issues, from the international stage to the individual household, including the health 
consequences of human behaviour, weather-related events and infectious diseases, and 
natural catastrophes and man-made disasters, all of which are discussed in this report. 
(WHO, 2007, p.1) 
 
Yet where Global Health Security has most frequently occurred within WHO discourse (and indeed 
the occasion for the World Health Report’s focus on that issue in 2007) is in relation to the revised 
IHR which were adopted by the World Health Assembly in 2005 and came into force in 2007. 
Although the Global Health Security terminology does not appear in the IHR, it has become 
inextricably linked with them. 
 
The IHR are explicitly concerned with preventing the international spread of disease, and in Annex 2 
of the 2005 Regulations (WHO, 2005, p.43) a ‘decision instrument’ flow chart is provided which 
allows for a determination of whether or not a disease outbreak occurring within a state falls under 
the regulations. If it does the WHO must be notified. Although unspecified events of potential 
international public health concern are catered for in the decision instrument, the diseases which 
are specifically listed all have relatively high levels of morbidity/mortality; are acute in their impacts; 
and have the potential to rapidly cross borders. (c.f. Feldbaum and Lee, 2004, p.24-5). Some diseases 
(Smallpox, Poliomyelitis due to wild-type poliovirus; new sub-types of human influenza, and SARS) 
are automatically notifiable. Others (such as cholera, pneumonic plague and yellow fever) require 
public health authorities to determine whether or not the WHO should be notified under the IHR. 
Clearly, then, the answer to the ‘security from what?’ question is relatively clear in this case: Global 
Health Security via the IHR is about the containment of potentially serious and rapidly-spreading 
infectious disease threats, whether natural or man-made. 
 In terms of the referent object – the ‘security for whom?’ question - it is certainly true that the WHO 
has attempted to look beyond the state in order to enhance the ability of the international 
community to respond to the threats posed by disease in a globalized world. In security terms it has 
not, however, brought about a change in referent object. David Fidler, who has written widely on 
the Westphalian to post-Westphalian transition (e.g. Fidler, 2004), has been perhaps the most vocal 
in proclaiming the significance of the WHO’s embrace of Global Health Security (which he explicitly 
contrasts with “international health security”) as a new “governance strategy” (Fidler, 2005, pp.347-
8). In a lengthy examination of the revision of the IHR and the successful promotion of the concept 
of Global Health Security Fidler notes (2005, p.392) that 
 
The revised IHR perceive a new world forming, in which global health security is a 
fundamental governance challenge for all humanity from the local to the global level. The 
world of global health security is one in which governments, intergovernmental 
organizations and non-State actors collaborate in a ‘‘new way of working’’ by contributing 
toward a common goal through science, technology and law rather than through anarchical 
competition for power. 
 
He concludes by noting that 
 
Global health security’s premise is that diseases will keep threatening human health. Global 
health security’s promise is that governance of disease threats can remove the dead hand of 
the classical regime and wield effectively the new way of working through the new IHR. 
 
Fidler does not go so far as to claim that Global Health Security has completely abandoned the state 
as the referent object. He does, however, see the new IHR-based  Global Health Security regime as 
significantly different from the ‘classical regime’ which preceded it. In particular he points to the 
importance of two changes. The first is that the IHR draw together threats which were previously 
dealt with under separate regimes (for example the regulations apply to infectious disease but also 
biological, chemical and radiological agents, whether deliberately or accidentally released) under a 
single “comprehensive governance strategy” (Fidler, 2005, p.363). The second is that the WHO is no 
longer limited to receiving information on outbreaks from state sources: it can now also actively 
seek information from a range of non-governmental sources (Fidler, 2005, p.348). The explicit 
authorization for WHO to gather information from non-state sources (although this was actually 
agreed by the World Health Assembly in 2001) is a genuine advance towards a more effective global 
system of disease control. Fidler’s (2005, p.376) argument is that this “changes the surveillance 
dynamic between WHO and member states in ways that favour global health security over national 
sovereignty.” This may well be correct (although I would caution that we have yet to see a real 
‘crunch case’). Indeed I concur with Adam Kamradt-Scott’s view  (Kamradt-Scott, 2010) that this 
change in WHO’s mandate can be considered the emergence of a new international norm. But whilst 
Fidler (2005, p.365) highlights the fact that “global health security differs from the state-centric 
approach of international health security found in the classical regime”, in effect what we now have 
under the IHR 2005 is not a system in which state-centrism has been abandoned entirely, but rather 
‘states+’ – a safety-net which helps to deal with situations in which a state is either unable or 
unwilling to report a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. Both the IHR and the 
concept of Global Health Security which has been so closely linked with it remain, in security terms, 
stubbornly state-centric: the referent object remains the state. This is still very much a statist rather 
than a globalist vision of global health. 
 
Given that WHO is a multilateral international organization composed of member states this should 
probably come as no surprise, but the extent to which the IHR remain rooted in a statist approach to 
global health helps to drive the point home.5 The regulations apply only to Public Health 
Emergencies of International Concern. With the exception of the small number of diseases specified 
as automatically notifiable, where there is no risk of international spread, nor a risk of international 
restrictions on travel or trade, then the outbreak is not classed as notifiable under the IHR (and 
presumably is not considered a risk to Global Health Security). It may be argued that the logic of 
globalization dictates that significant disease events rarely have absolutely no potential international 
impact, but it remains the case that purely domestic public health events do not fall under the 
regulations. The IHR, then, are concerned primarily with pathogens crossing state boundaries, and so 
have a rather traditional aim: the defence of the borders of the nation-state from exogenous disease 
threats (as well as the protection of the state in which the outbreak occurs from the imposition by 
others of disproportionate travel and trade restrictions). Those who attended the 1851 International 
Sanitary Convention (who were seeking to protect their countries from cholera) would have readily 
recognised the underlying purposes of the 2005 IHR. In those terms the IHR do not represent a 
radical change in the conceptualisation of who is being secured, or from what, under the Global 
Health Security system. 
 
Even if it was not the way in which the regulations were intended, there does at least seem to be a 
logic to the suspicion that the vision of Global Health Security which underpins the IHR is really 
about the protection of Western states from exogenous disease threats. This may in itself be a 
laudable aim, but it leads to important questions about the apportionment of rights and 
responsibilities. The obligations placed on states by the 2005 revision of the IHR are significant. Far 
more is required of national health authorities than was the case under the previous regime. The 
necessity for many states, and particularly those in the developing world, to make significant 
investments in their domestic disease surveillance infrastructure was well-known during the 
negotiation of the IHR revisions and is recognised in the regulations: Annex 1 of the IHR includes 
details of ‘core capacity requirements for surveillance and response’. But whilst such investments 
may well be essential to the effective functioning of the Global Health Security regime, they may not 
reflect domestic health priorities. The potential for tensions to arise over these issues is clear. 
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 This point is developed further in Rushton, 2009. 
  
The Global Health Security Initiative: WMD and pandemic influenza 
 
The Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI) is far more explicitly about the protection of developed 
Western states from exogenous disease threats. Initially formed to deal with bioterror concerns in 
the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the GHSI has subsequently broadened its remit to address naturally-
occurring outbreaks via an engagement in recent years with pandemic influenza. It is interesting to 
see how the GHSI’s agenda has broadened over time, as evidenced in the ministerial communiqués. 
The ministerial statement released after the first meeting in 2001 reported that 
 
The meeting provided an opportunity to discuss a more coordinated approach to improving 
the health security of citizens, and to better prepare for and respond to acts of terrorism, in 
the aftermath of September 11, 2001. Following the meeting, the participants issued a 
statement calling for concerted global action to strengthen the public health response to the 
threat of international biological, chemical and radio-nuclear terrorism. (Global Health 
Security Initiative, 2001)  
 
The 2003 ministerial statement heralded the start of the shift, noting toward the end that 
 
Furthermore, we recognize that preparedness for and response to bioterrorism have much 
in common with preparedness for and response to naturally occurring global health threats 
such as pandemic influenza. Much work needs to be done to enhance preparedness by 
member countries and globally by addressing critical issues for an effective pandemic 
response. To this end we have agreed to the Terms of Reference for the Technical Working 
Group on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness. (Global Health Security Initiative, 2003)  
 
Move forward to the statement released following the meeting held in London in December 2009 
and we find the (arguably slightly disingenuous) claim that 
 
Our initiative has progressed considerably since its establishment in 2001, and our common 
purpose remains the same: to enhance our respective capacities to prepare for and respond 
to health threats posed by chemical, biological and radiological and nuclear terrorism and 
pandemic influenza; and to undertake concerted action to strengthen health security 
globally. (Global Health Security Initiative, 2009)  
 The answer to the ‘security from what?’ question is clear in the case of the GHSI, although that 
answer has changed over time. Beginning with a set of very traditional national security concerns, its 
remit has widened as pandemic influenza has been increasingly recognised by Western security 
communities as a national security threat. But nevertheless this still fits well within – indeed is a part 
of – the consensus position on health security threats outlined above. The same is true of the types 
of response measure that the GHSI has developed. One of the GHSI’s key raisons d’etre is improving 
information-sharing between the countries involved in terms of policy and best practice and also 
crisis management during a major disease event. The GHSI’s ‘Global Health Security Action Group’ 
(GHSAG) is the primary vehicle for achieving this.  
 
This leads us on to the ‘security for whom?’ question. The GHSI is explicitly a cooperative 
international security arrangement designed to enhance the national security of its members from 
bioterrorist attack (and latterly pandemic influenza). Yet it is open to the criticism that it is aimed at 
enhancing security for some, not for all. The GHSI is a (globally unrepresentative) group of ‘like-
minded countries’ which comprises Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the United 
Kingdom, the United States and the European Commission. With the possible exception of Mexico, 
then, it is a club of wealthy developed nations, closely mirroring the G8.6 Despite the rhetoric about 
strengthening health security globally, and the rhetorical support for the WHO’s efforts on Global 
Health Security, it would be no surprise to find people who believe that the main purpose of the 
GHSI is to advance the security only of its own members.  
 
  
Alternative views of Global Health Security 
 
In recent years we have seen challenges emerging to the concept of Global Health Security, 
particularly from the Global South. Many of these debates were identified by Aldis. These challenges 
have been framed in various ways. In some instances the use of the Global Health Security 
terminology has been directly challenged. Brazil, for example, argued in the WHO Executive Board in 
January 2008 that there “was no clear meaning of the term and that it enjoyed no consensus among 
members of the World Health Assembly”, and objected the WHO Secretariat’s use of such language 
in relation to the IHR (which do not use the “security” term) in the 2007 World Health Report 
(Tayob, 2008). In November of the previous year there had again been controversy over the term in 
the intergovernmental working group on influenza virus sharing, when the EU proposed including 
Global Health Security language in the statement then being negotiated. Tayob (2008) reports that  
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 Although it is not exactly the same, Russia being absent and Mexico being included. 
The EU proposal was strongly objected to by several developing countries, including 
Indonesia, India, Brazil and Thailand. Brazil had then said there is no reference in the 
resolution WHA 60.28 (on avian flu) to "global health security" and that it was not 
committed to working under the security concept. Eventually, the term "global health 
security" was dropped from the statement of the November meeting. (see also Shashikant, 
2007) 
 
Contra Aldis, I would argue that these arguments are not the result of the lack of agreement on how 
Global Health Security is defined, but rather on the political implications of the concept. I am less 
confident than Aldis that the difficulties can be overcome through attempting to achieve a “common 
understanding of the concept” (Aldis, 2008, p.374). Indeed, Global Health Security has effectively 
been (and will continue to be) defined through practice, not some separate process of definitional 
negotiation. Such practice is inevitably fundamentally affected by the distribution of power in the 
international system. It should be no surprise that a global system designed to protect states from 
disease privileges the protection of the most powerful states in the international system. Much of 
the debate is in fact around the apportionment of the costs and benefits of global health security, a 
debate which was vividly illustrated by the dispute between Indonesia and the WHO over the 
sharing of influenza virus samples (e.g. Elbe, 2010b; Fidler 2008; Holbrooke & Garrett, 2008; 
Kamradt-Scott and Lee in this issue).  
 
Yet the currently dominant version of Global Health Security is only one possible conceptualization. 
It is certainly possible to conceptualise a more globalist vision of Global Health Security in which the 
referent object is the individual and the types of threats which need to be defended against are 
framed much more broadly, capturing the wide range of factors which negatively impact on health 
and wellbeing in both the developing and developed worlds. Davies (2010) found evidence of just 
such a globalist vision in a number of areas of the global health discourse. The Oslo Ministerial 
Declaration of 2007 (Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil et al, 2007) is an intriguing case in this 
regard as it brought together countries from both the Global North and the Global South (specifically 
Brazil, France, Indonesia, Norway, Senegal, South Africa and Thailand) and did indeed indicate that 
there are a broader range of shared health-related concerns amongst these countries that could be 
addressed under the banner of ‘Global Health Security’ (the Oslo Ministerial Declaration, indeed, 
uses that terminology) but which lie outside the scope of the dominant conceptualization. The Oslo 
Declaration certainly discusses the traditional menu of issues – pandemic influenza, and HIV/AIDS, 
for example – but it also discusses environmental challenges, broader development issues and 
international trade policies. Although the Oslo Declaration is in many ways statist – it certainly sees 
states as the actors primarily responsible for ensuring Global Health Security - it does offer a glimpse 
of a broader answer to the ‘security from what?’ question.  
 
The human security approach, discussed above, is perhaps the best attempt to date to provide a 
radically different answer to the ‘security for whom?’ question, and is certainly a more genuinely 
globalist conception of security. This begs the question of why a human security-derived version of 
Global Health Security has not gained more policy traction. Davies (2010: 1189) notes that “in 
practice, little progress has been made without calling upon traditional statist concerns and without 
representing health problems as potential threats to state stability, the economy and the ‘rich’ world 
as much as the ‘poor’”, and this would certainly chime with what International Relations as a 
discipline has to tell us about global political prioritization. But this also seems to be part of a bigger 
story about the decline of the wider human security agenda. Although it has been used rhetorically 
as a critical tool and a justification for certain policy directions, human security has in fact had only a 
marginal policy impact. Victories have been claimed for it – the international ban on landmines is the 
most commonly-cited – and a number of organizations have adopted the human security brand in 
their titles. But as a distinctive concept it now seems to occur far less frequently in policy statements 
than it did a decade ago. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh of Sciences Po has suggested a number of reasons 
why human security “has not been adopted and mainstreamed” and “has, ultimately, not been 
operationalized as it should have been” (Tadjbakhsh, 2005). Whilst agreeing with much of that 
analysis I here propose one additional explanation which relates directly to important shifts in global 
health governance, and indeed in the wider global aid architecture, over the last 10-15 years. That 
explanation is this: that human security has found itself caught in a pincer movement by two other 
paradigms of global health, namely (inter)national security (which, as discussed above, has 
increasingly seen health as being within its remit) and a resurgent international development. One of 
human security’s two claims to distinctiveness (the recognition of a broader range of threats) no 
longer seems as distinctive as it did in 1994. These were the immediate post-Cold War years in which 
security establishments were dominated by traditionalist security concerns. It is hard nowadays to 
find a national security official who thinks only in terms of traditional military threats to the state. 
Indeed, as David Chandler (2008) has argued, what once seemed a radical approach to security has 
been comfortably integrated into the mainstream of security policy. In specifically health terms, 
many of the health threats to human security which are identified in the literature are equally well 
captured in contemporary (inter)national security thinking. Those that aren’t (e.g. non-
communicable disease threats) continue to be marginalized in Global Health Governance and are 
rarely if ever discussed in security language, suggesting that the progress which has been made in 
forwarding a broader vision of health security threats has been limited to say the least. The other 
distinctive claim of human security (its focus on individuals and communities) suffers from the fact 
that it is both difficult to implement in practice in a global governance system dominated by states, 
and that it shares so much with ideas of international development (and, for that matter, human 
rights). It was in the Human Development Report that human security was first highlighted in a 
major way, and it is often remarked that much of the content of human security is equally well 
captured in the concept of human development (e.g. Stewart, 2006). As development has moved up 
policy agendas markedly in recent years – a move most dramatically expressed in the adoption of 
the Millennium Development Goals which have motivated a massive increase in health spending in 
certain specific areas  – human security rhetoric has tended to play a subservient role to that of 
international development. 
 
 
Conclusion: Global Health Security and global discontent 
 It is no wonder that some fear that the real agenda behind the promotion of the concept of Global 
Health Security – at least as that concept seems to be used in the policy discourse - is to protect the 
developed world from diseases which, epidemiologically speaking, tend to emerge from the 
developing world. Furthermore, (whilst there are good public health reasons for it) the emphasis on 
containing outbreaks of those diseases within the developing world heightens the suspicion that 
Global Health Security is really about protecting ‘us’ from ‘them’. Alternative conceptualisations 
exist at the margins – and it is clear that there is a concerted effort from parts of the Global South to 
forward a much broader view of the health challenges which they face – but to date the narrow 
conceptualisation dominates the mainstream policy agenda. Alongside the tension over who 
benefits from the Global Health Security system there has been disagreement over the distribution 
of costs. As a number of critics have noted, it is the developing world which is being asked to bear 
many of the costs of Global Health Security. These result both from the requirement that they invest 
in biosecurity measures in order to meet the core capacity requirements under the IHR and the 
expectation that, in the event of emergency, they will undertake economically damaging emergency 
measures such as the culling of animal populations or the purchase of expensive pharmaceuticals 
(Ingram, 2008).  
 
Again it is worth re-stating that there is nothing inherently wrong in the aim of limiting the 
international spread of infectious diseases. Indeed it is an important task for Global Health 
Governance. The political problem, however, is the widespread feeling that costs and benefits are 
not being equitably shared, and that the opportunity to engage in an open debate about the 
appropriate prioritization of different activities is being denied. In the absence of the resources 
required to adequately address all global health problems choices inevitably have to be made. At 
their most stark these choices may come down to funding one priority at the expense of others 
(Hoffman, 2010, p.516). This, it is argued here, is the heart of the current debate. Although the 
objections of some developing countries to Global Health Security have been made on the basis that 
there is no clear definition of the term this doesn’t seem to be the heart of the problem. The 
problem does not in reality seem to be about confusion over the meaning of health security. In fact 
the opposite: there is a feeling that “we all know what’s going on here”, and that what is going on is 
weighted towards the protection of the West rather than undertaking other measures (such as 
investing in strengthening health systems) which may do more to benefit the rest. Many developing 
states lack the basic health infrastructure necessary to deal with everyday threats let alone respond 
to global health emergencies and some of them are coming to resent the emphasis being placed on 
a small number of diseases which worry the West. As Abraham notes in his paper in this issue (p.21), 
“countries lower down in the global economic and political pecking order are compelled to securitize 
issues which might not pose a great threat to them.”  There is a pressing need for a far more explicit 
recognition of the primary beneficiaries from the Global Health Security system, and of who is 
bearing the costs. Only in the light of such a recognition can meaningful debates be carried out over 
the appropriate prioritization of such activities in relation to other global health challenges.  
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